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Selling the Name on the Schoolhouse Gate
Th e First Amendment and the Sale 
of Public School Naming Rights
By Joseph Blocher 
In the past fi ve years, the sale of naming rights to public 
school events and facilities has grown from fodder for 
humor columnists into a nationwide, multimillion-dollar 
enterprise.1 And although commercialism in schools is 
nothing new, granting naming rights to public school facili-
ties in exchange for remuneration raises novel and diffi  cult 
First Amendment problems that schools and their attorneys 
will fi nd increasingly diffi  cult to ignore.2
Th e basic First Amendment issue arises out of schools’ 
understandable desire to choose the sponsors whose names 
will adorn their facilities or events. In the past, naming 
rights mostly involved “safe” sponsors like grocery stories 
and banks. But these days the fi rst would-be sponsor to show 
up with a check may not be as innocuous as the local grocer. 
For example, to the many schools that have recently taken 
stands against the in-school sale of soft  drinks and junk food 
as a way to address concerns about childhood obesity, Coca-
Cola and Nestlé may be sponsors non grata.3 Moreover, 
1. Elizabeth Chang, “A School By Any Other Name Would Be . . . 
Richer,” Washington Post, December 12, 1999; “So What’s Next, 
Nike Elementary?” editorial, Baton Rouge Advocate, March 29, 
1998; Anita Powell, “Round Rock ISD Looks to Sell Stadium Name,” 
Austin (Texas) American Statesman, October 30, 2003.
2. Alex Molnar., Sponsored Schools and Commercialized 
Classrooms: Schoolhouse Commercializing Trends in the 1990’s, 6–7, 
26 (Center for the Analysis of Commercialism in Educ, 1998); see 
also Molnar, “Sixth Annual Report on Commercialism in Schools: 
Cashing in on the Classroom,” Educational Leadership Magazine, 
December 2003–January 2004, 79, reporting a “marked increase” 
in six categories of schoolhouse commercialism from 2001–2002 to 
2002–2003.
3. “Junk Food Ban Approved for Schools,” Chicago Tribune, 
October 11, 2006, (Redeye edition); Seema Mehta, “Sorry, Cupcake, 
You’re No Longer Welcome in Class: To Fight Student Obesity, 
Educators Opt for Celebratory Carrots and Books,” Los Angeles 
Times, September 27, 2006 (Metro edition). 
experience in other areas of government sponsorship sug-
gests that soft  drink and candy companies are not the biggest 
threat. Other undesirable sponsors—including advocates of 
truly reprehensible political and social ideas—may be lurk-
ing, hoping, quite literally, to make a name for themselves 
through a school sponsorship deal.4
Unfortunately, simply saying “no” to these sponsors may 
be more diffi  cult than school boards expect. Th e selection 
of named sponsors raises concerns that can lead straight 
from the schoolhouse to the courthouse: Once a school 
has one named sponsor, other would-be sponsors may be 
able to claim a First Amendment right to participate, just 
as would-be speakers have a constitutional right to partici-
pate in other government-created forums. Unfortunately, 
very few school board policies are currently attuned to this 
First Amendment concern, leaving schools that turn down 
a sponsor’s off er open to charges of viewpoint and content 
discrimination and the very real possibility that they will 
have to accept sponsors whose products or message they 
oppose. 
Th is article attempts to give schools and their attorneys 
a means to avoid those charges. It is intended as a guide for 
school boards and school attorneys trying to fi nd their way 
through the maze of First Amendment law surrounding 
the sale of public school naming rights. Its purpose is not to 
advocate for or against any particular approach to naming 
rights; that decision is properly within the discretion of the 
school board, whose members face the unenviable task of 
balancing the need for funding with the myriad diffi  culties 
that naming rights arrangements inevitably raise. Th e more 
limited goal here is to help school boards maintain control 
4. See John K. Eason, “Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions 
in Charitable Naming Gift s: When Good Names Go Bad,” U.C. 
Davis Law Review 38, no. 2 (2005): 375, 387, 394–402 (discussing 
examples of “charitably inclined malfeasants whose names now 
adorn various charitable institutions or facilities across the 
nation”); Editorial, “County Should Have Rejected Nazis,” Portland 
Oregonian, February 4, 2005 (Sunrise edition), reporting that the 
county, fearing lawsuits, allowed the American Nazi Party to adopt 
a stretch of highway.
Th e author, a former law clerk at the School of Government of the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, is a graduate of Yale Law 
School. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fortieth 
Annual School Attorneys’ Conference at the School of Government 
in February 2007. Th ese issues are discussed in far greater detail in 
Joseph Blocher, “School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s 
Perfect Storm,” Georgetown Law Journal  96 (forthcoming 2007).
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over the names on their schools, whatever policies they 
endorse.5
Th e fi rst part of the article outlines the policy consider-
ations surrounding school naming rights sales. Th is brief 
overview demonstrates that while sales of school naming 
rights have become increasingly common, such sales raise 
diffi  cult policy problems that may lead school offi  cials to try 
to reject sponsors they see as particularly undesirable. Th e 
second part of the article explains how attempts to pick and 
choose among potential sponsors may run into constitu-
tional obstacles and briefl y describes the First Amendment 
categories implicated by such sales. It discusses the defi ni-
tion and governing standard of each category and sug-
gests how school boards can best take advantage of those 
standards to defend against First Amendment challenges to 
sponsorship exclusions. Th e third, fi nal part of the article 
suggests other ways forward, such as policy moves that may 
insulate schools from future sponsorship controversies. 
Policy Considerations: The Pros and Cons 
of Naming Rights Deals
Th e public school naming rights boom has been driven by 
two forces: schools’ need for money and businesses’ need 
for advertising.6 For school administrators seeking to fi ll 
holes in their budgets, naming rights present a particularly 
attractive potential revenue stream. Unlike other forms of 
commercial sponsorship—such as exclusive pouring rights 
for soft  drink manufacturers or sponsored educational 
materials—naming rights do not necessarily require schools 
to change their daily schedules or curricula. Th ey are, in 
that sense, a “free” resource that every school possesses 
(even if some schools’ names command a higher value on 
the market than others). Paul Vallas, chief executive of the 
Philadelphia public schools, is unabashed in his support 
for naming rights deals: “My approach is Leave No Dol-
lar Behind. Th ere are tremendous needs in this system, 
where 85 percent of the kids are below poverty level. I’m not 
uncomfortable with corporations giving us money and get-
ting their names on things. As long as it’s not in appropriate, 
5. Th e article does not address in any detail the complicated 
contractual issues surrounding naming rights deals. For more 
information on those problems, see generally, Robert H. Th ornburg, 
Note, “Stadium Naming Rights: An Assessment of the Contract 
and Trademark Issues Inherent to Both Professional and Collegiate 
Stadiums,” Virginia Sports and Entertainment Law Journal 2, no. 
2 (2003): 328; Debra E. Blum, “Donors Increasingly Use Legal 
Contracts to Stipulate Demands on Charities,” Chronicle of 
Philanthropy, March 21, 2002, 9.
6. Izzy Gould, “What’s in a Name? Extra Cash, Perhaps,” Tampa 
Tribune, December 21, 2004 (Sports), 1; Molnar, Sponsored Schools, 
10, noting that “[t]he justifi cation for the sponsorship agreements 
most oft en used by educators is the need for money.” 
I don’t see any downside.”7 And indeed many school 
offi  cials insist that there is no downside. A recent survey 
of North Carolina public school principals found that 
73.9 percent “felt either mostly positive or somewhat posi-
tive about corporate sponsored events,” and 56.9 percent 
said they would maintain their relationships with corporate 
sponsors even if other funds were available to support the 
activities currently underwritten by sponsors.8 
Nonetheless, school naming rights arrangements do 
implicate major policy concerns, the weight of which may 
cause schools to try to limit either the scope of sponsorship 
deals or the kinds of sponsors they deal with. Perhaps the 
easiest to reject are off ers from “bad name” sponsors such 
as alcohol and tobacco companies or others whose products 
are considered inappropriate for children.9 As one school 
board president said, “Look, no one is suggesting us con-
tracting with Delilah’s Den [a local gentleman’s club]. We 
wouldn’t consider a product tie-in. . . . But everyone uses 
food, so we contracted with a supermarket, a local super-
market. We’re talking to local banks, people like that.”10 
Questionable commercial sponsors, however, are not the 
only inappropriate possibility, and nightmare scenarios 
may be more likely than schools suspect. Th e fi rst group to 
show up with a check may be a church, or a mosque, or the 
National Rifl e Association, or the Gay & Lesbian Alliance 
Against Defamation, or some other group with a contro-
versial identity or message that schools would rather avoid 
endorsing.
Even an apparently “good” sponsor may carry unforeseen 
but weighty baggage. In 1999 the Houston Astros sold the 
naming rights of their new stadium to Enron, whose CEO, 
Kenneth Lay, threw out the fi rst pitch in the stadium. At 
fi rst, this seemed to be an excellent deal for all the parties: 
the team received $100 million, and the company (not to 
mention Lay himself) got the right to put its name on the 
franchise for thirty years. But just two years later, the com-
pany’s spectacular collapse cost thousands of Houstonians 
their jobs and Lay faced charges for fraud and conspiracy.11 
Nor were the Astros the only recipients of Lay’s problematic 
 7. Quoted in Tamar Lewin, “In Public Schools, the Name Game 
As a Donor Lure,” New York Times, January 26, 2006.
 8. Joseph Di Bona et al., “Commercialism in North Carolina 
High Schools: A Survey of Principals’ Perceptions,” Peabody Journal 
of Education 78, no. 2 (2003): 41, 52, 56, 58.
 9. See, e.g., Mark Zaloudek, “Should Donors Get to Name Public 
Schools?” Sarasota Herald-Tribune, March 21, 2005, reporting that 
Philadelphia public schools refuse naming rights deals with alcohol 
or tobacco companies.
10. Robert Strauss, “Education: P.S. (Your Name Here),” New 
York Times, December 16, 2001 (New Jersey Weekly).
11. Th e naming rights were later resold to Minute Maid, a 
subsidiary of Coca-Cola, which paid $100 million for twenty-eight 
years of naming rights. 
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largesse. He also donated $1.1 million to his alma mater, the 
University of Missouri, to endow the Kenneth L. Lay Chair 
in Economics. When the company collapsed and Lay’s own 
business ethics were called into serious question, the uni-
versity was left  with a major problem—and a still-unfi lled 
professorship—which it has yet to resolve.12 Other, equally 
uncomfortable examples are not hard to fi nd.
Finally, as noted above, many people oppose commercial 
deals that expose students to products like sugary or fatty 
snack foods, which may lead many schools to avoid naming 
rights deals with their purveyors.13 And, as the heated bat-
tles over commercial activity in schools have demonstrated, 
even when the products themselves are un objectionable, 
many people oppose naming rights deals on the grounds 
that schools that accept them are “selling out” to com-
mercial sponsors and cheapening the “honor bestowed on 
long-time public servants and civic leaders when a facil-
ity is named for them.”14 Opponents also argue that such 
deals expose vulnerable children to advertising that they 
are unable to fi lter out and interfere with the schools’ core 
educational missions.15 Even when naming rights avoid 
these pitfalls, they can implicate other broad policy con-
cerns; they might threaten interschool equity by channeling 
money to schools in affl  uent areas where students and their 
parents have more disposable income to spend on the spon-
sor’s products.16 Finally, some critics have alleged that the 
sale of naming rights privatizes civic responsibility, making 
schools dependent on corporate dollars and making tax-
payers less likely to vote for school funding measures.17
12. As reported by MSNBC on May 26, 2006, “Lay’s Alma Mater 
Struggles with Donation: Seeks ‘Alternative Use’ for Stock Profi ts 
Instead of Economics Position.” 
13. See Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Issue Brief, “Th e Role 
of Media in Childhood Obesity” (October 2004), www.kff .org/
entmedia/entmedia022404pkg.cfm.
14. See, e.g., Ruth Sheehan, “Too Late to Cry ‘Sellout,’” Raleigh 
News and Observer, January 20, 2003; Larry King, “Th e World-
Herald’s Priority Is What Best Serves the Readers,” Omaha World 
Herald, August 10, 2003, explaining the newspaper’s decision to 
call a convention center by its popular name despite a recent sale of 
naming rights.
15. Citizens’ Campaign for Commercial-Free Schools, “What’s 
Wrong with Commercializing the Public Schools?” (undated), www.
scn.org/cccs/arguments.html (last visited August 16, 2007). See also 
Eason, “Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in Charitable 
Naming Gift s,” 399.
16. See Randy Krebs, “Our View: Schools Should Th ink before 
Entering Deal for Naming Rights,” St. Cloud (Minn.) Times, July 
19, 2005, noting that a technology company was focusing its school 
sponsorship eff orts on “the nation’s wealthiest school districts.”
17. Christine McDonald, “Got Cash? Buy School Name: To 
Ease Tight Budgets, Plymouth-Canton, Others Ponder Sale of 
Naming Rights to Buildings, Events,” Detroit News, June 27, 2005; 
ERIC Clearinghouse for Educational Management, “Business 
Partnerships with Schools,” Policy Report No. 2 (Fall 2001): 10.
As these competing policy concerns illustrate, school 
boards who choose to engage in naming rights deals are 
oft en caught between the need to secure funding and the 
need to assuage citizens’ concerns about the scope and con-
tent of the deals. School administrators (and their attorneys) 
will probably attempt to navigate these diffi  cult straits by 
limiting the kinds of sponsors to whom they will sell nam-
ing rights, rejecting sponsors whose identities, products, or 
messages they do not endorse. But, although this could be 
a wise policy, it is one the First Amendment might foreclose.
The Relevance of the First Amendment 
Rejecting a would-be sponsor is not as simple as refusing 
to cash its check. Lurking in discussions of government 
sponsorship deals is a set of First Amendment concerns 
that could force schools to accept naming rights deals with 
sponsors they want to avoid. Specifi cally, the First Amend-
ment may limit schools’ ability to reject sponsors based 
on their identity or message. School naming rights are 
undoubtedly a form of “speech,” even if the precise mes-
sage and speaker are somewhat unclear. Indeed, courts have 
already recognized a First Amendment right to participate 
in similar government sponsorship programs, suggesting 
that would-be school sponsors could also fi nd traction for 
their claims.
Th e horror stories from these government sponsorship 
cases should send shivers down the spine of any school 
board attorney. In a recent string of cases, the Ku Klux 
Klan tried to become an acknowledged sponsor of a public 
radio station in Missouri and sought to get its name on 
Adopt-a-Highway signs across the country.18 Predictably, 
the government offi  cials responsible for these programs 
refused to accept the Klan’s off er of participation. And, 
perhaps just as predictably, the Klan has repeatedly sued on 
First Amendment grounds. While it has not been successful 
in all its challenges, it did win the right to adopt a stretch 
of Missouri roadway—perhaps a portent of the ultimate 
nightmare for schools.19
18. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the University of 
Missouri, 203 F.3d 1085, 1094 (8th Cir. 2000); Cuffl  ey v. Mickes, 
208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000).
19. Cuffl  ey was decided on Equal Protection grounds, but the 
court specifi cally noted that “[w]hether this claim arises under the 
Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment, it is clear that the 
State may not deny access to the Adopt-A-Highway program based 
on the applicant’s views.” Id. at 760 n.3. But see Texas v. Knights of 
the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the 
state’s reason for denying the Klan’s application to adopt a portion 
of highway outside a public housing project was reasonable and 
viewpoint neutral because the state sought to prevent the Klan 
from intimidating residents and frustrating a federal desegregation 
order).
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Th ere are not yet any reported cases of sponsors suing 
schools to force their names onto school facilities. Th is is 
most likely a refl ection of the fact that school naming rights 
policies have not been around long enough to give rise to 
such cases. Th ey are all but inevitable in the future as nam-
ing rights policies become more common and the stakes on 
both sides rise. But although First Amendment litigation 
over school naming rights seems inevitable, neither the 
outcome of that litigation nor even the First Amendment 
standards that will govern it is quite so clear. Despite the 
simplicity of the First Amendment’s language—“Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of Speech”20—
it accords diff erent levels of protection to diff erent kinds of 
speech, depending on the speaker, the message, and where 
the speech occurs.21 As a result, there are a variety of dif-
ferent First Amendment tests governing diff erent forms of 
speech, including sponsorship deals like school naming 
rights. 
Unfortunately, school naming rights do not easily fi t 
within any one of these tests, as it is diffi  cult to establish 
who is “speaking” through a paid naming rights arrange-
ment, what that speaker is saying, and in what forum the 
speech takes place. Th e overview below considers the three 
areas of First Amendment law that appear to be most rel-
evant to school naming rights: government speech, com-
mercial speech, and forum analysis. For each category, 
the discussion identifi es the scope of the category (i.e., the 
defi nition that a naming rights deal would have to satisfy to 
fall within its scope); describes the governing standard (the 
hurdle a school would have to clear to regulate the naming 
rights); and, fi nally, off ers suggestions of ways school attor-
neys can best take advantage of the category.
GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Government speech is an ill-defi ned and somewhat con-
troversial constitutional category that, despite its uncertain 
20. U.S. Const. amend. 1.
21. Many scholars have called for a more evenhanded application 
of the amendment. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson and William G. 
Buss, “Th e Many Faces of Government Speech,” Iowa Law Review 
86 (2001): 1377, 1384 (2001) (arguing that “there is no basis or 
need for any special form of privilege or immunity for government 
speech”); Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, “Who’s Afraid of 
Commercial Speech?” Virginia Law Review 76 (1990): 627 (arguing 
that commercial speech should be entitled to full First Amendment 
protection); William V. Van Alstyne, “To What Extent Does the 
Power of Government to Determine the Boundaries and Conditions 
of Lawful Commerce Permit Government to Declare Who May 
Advertise and Who May Not?” Emory Law Journal 51 (2002): 1513, 
1554 (2002) (“[F]rom one quite reasonable view one might well 
argue (as will be done here) that there is far less reason in this area 
(‘commerce’) than in others (e.g., ‘politics’?) to depart from strict 
scrutiny review.”).
origins, has a fair amount of common sense appeal.22 In 
essence, it recognizes that the government (schools and 
school boards for the purposes of this article) can at times 
be a “speaker” and that when the government speaks it is 
generally entitled to say what it wants. 
Defi nition of government speech
Th e Supreme Court has never established a specifi c defi ni-
tion of government speech, but the development of the doc-
trine suggests the concerns and characteristics that shaped 
it. Th e category of government speech, such as it is, arose in 
a series of cases involving government subsidies to private 
actors. Th e seminal case is Rust v. Sullivan,23 in which the 
Supreme Court upheld Title X of the Public Health Services 
Act, which withholds government funds from clinics that 
provide information about abortion. Rejecting the clinics’ 
First Amendment challenge, the Court held that “[t]he gov-
ernment can, without violating the Constitution, selectively 
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to 
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding 
an alternative program which seeks to deal with the prob-
lem in another way.”24
Subsequent cases applying Rust have confi rmed that the 
government may “speak” through its support of private 
actors. Th us, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the 
University of Virginia, the Supreme Court held that that a 
public university could not refuse to fund student publica-
tions that expressed belief in a deity.25 And in Legal Services 
Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court again read Rust as protecting 
the government’s right to engage in viewpoint discrimina-
tion when it speaks on its own behalf, but not when it sub-
sidizes private speakers.26 Th e relevant question in all cases 
22. Note, “Th e Curious Relationship between the Compelled 
Speech and Government Speech Doctrines,” Harvard Law Review 
117, no. 7 (2004): 2411, 2432 (“Th e government speech line of cases 
remains the ugly stepchild of First Amendment doctrine.”). Th e 
pioneering work arguing for greater recognition of government as a 
creator of speech, and not just its regulator, is Mark G. Yudof, When 
Government Speaks: Politics, Law, and Government Expression in 
America (Berkeley, Calif., 1983).
23. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Earlier cases implicitly reached the 
conclusion that Rust eventually adopted. See, e.g., Muir v. Alabama 
Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1044 (5th Cir. 1982) (en 
banc).
24. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
25. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Although scholars tend to identify 
Rosenberger as a pillar of government speech doctrine, the Court 
actually approached the case through the lens of forum analysis. Id. 
at 829–31.
26. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (overturning statute providing 
government funding for public interest lawyers on condition 
that they not challenge welfare policy). See also Commonwealth 
v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (1895) (Holmes, J.), aff ’d sub nom Davis v. 
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897) (“For the legislature absolutely 
or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public 
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appears to be whether the message sent can properly be 
characterized as the government’s.27
Th e standard governing government speech 
Rust and its progeny made it clear that when the govern-
ment speaks, it may control its own message—it may select 
its viewpoint or content—without running afoul of the 
First Amendment. In the context of naming rights, this 
suggests that, to the degree that naming rights are “govern-
ment speech,” schools may pick and choose among sponsors 
based on their message and viewpoint.
Th e most subtle distinction—one that courts and scholars 
have struggled mightily to identify and apply—is between 
situations in which the government gives support to private 
speakers to deliver the government’s message and those in 
which it subsidizes private speakers with their own mes-
sages. In the latter case, as in Velazquez, the government 
may not engage in viewpoint discrimination.
Characterizing naming rights as government speech 
Government speech, because it gives schools the ability to 
express a viewpoint, is obviously a desirable category from 
the schools’ perspective. It allows them to exercise broad 
control over the names on their buildings, irrespective of 
sponsors’ own purported free speech claims. As the analysis 
above makes clear, the relevant question in any government 
speech analysis is whether the message is the government’s. 
So long as naming rights are seen as a form of government 
speech—that is, so long as they deliver the government’s 
message—schools have wide discretion to limit the deals 
they accept.
Schools hoping to put their naming rights in the govern-
ment speech category would do well to “claim” their names. 
Th ere are many ways to do so; the simplest is to limit the 
type and number of sponsors who are allowed to participate 
in a naming rights program in the fi rst place. If in the past a 
school or school district has essentially opened its doors to 
all would-be sponsors without scrutinizing their messages 
or identities, it will fi nd it exceedingly diffi  cult to claim 
in future cases that the choice of a name is its own act of 
speech.28 Th us, a school that exerts control over its naming 
park is no more an infringement of rights of a member of the public 
than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in the house.”). But 
see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
27. “Th e Curious Relationship between the Compelled Speech 
and Government Speech Doctrines,” 2412 (“[P]laintiff s have 
uniformly been willing to accept Rust’s defi nition of the battlefi eld: 
that is, the only question to be answered is the factual one of who is 
speaking.”).
28. Indeed, a school in this situation may have already 
inadvertently created a public forum—described in more detail 
below—and thus have lost control over sponsorship almost entirely. 
rights in the present will increase the control it can exert in 
the future.
An even better way to “claim” the school’s name is 
through written policies and consistent practices that treat 
the name as part of the school’s message or curriculum. 
Some policies state specifi cally that the school’s name sends 
an important message about the school.29 Other naming 
policies explicitly recognize, as the Newton Conover school 
board has done, that “naming or renaming a facility [is] a 
signifi cant endeavor since the name of a facility can refl ect 
upon the students, staff , school district and community.”30 
Courts are especially solicitous of restrictions on “speech” 
at school when they are presented as necessary to advance 
the school’s curricular and educational needs (which them-
selves seem to be a form of speech). Schools whose naming 
rights policies suggest the curricular value of naming rights 
will thus prove especially successful at earning the “govern-
ment speech” tag. For example, Rochester, New York, has a 
naming rights policy that explicitly connects the naming of 
schools to the schools’ educational mission.
Th is policy is based upon the belief that it is important 
that the students and public know of the many con-
tributions of many Rochester leaders of the past and 
other national heroes, and that this knowledge can be 
more strongly imprinted through classroom discus-
sion and projects related to school names.31
Even though courts have more oft en considered school cur-
ricula under the rubric of forum analysis (discussed below) 
than as government speech, the lesson for school boards 
and their attorneys is the same: Claiming the message as the 
school’s own is the best way to control it.
It is also possible that naming rights might be charac-
terized as government speech because they amount to a 
government endorsement of the named sponsor. Inasmuch 
as a school, by allowing a corporate or other sponsor to 
put its name on school facilities, is eff ectively sending an 
29. See, e.g., Carteret County (N.C.) Pub. School System, 
Regulation FF, “Naming School Facilities” (revised January 
2006): “Th e naming or renaming of a school or the creation of a 
commemorative or memorial is a matter deserving the thoughtful 
attention of the Board of Education,” www.carteretcountyschools.
org/hr/Facilities%20Development.pdf; Cobb County (Ga.) 
School District, Administrative Rule FF, “Naming of School 
Facilities” (revised December 8, 2005): “Th e Cobb County School 
District . . . recognizes that the offi  cial names of its facilities are vital 
to their public image,” www.cobbk12.org/centraloffi  ce/adminrules/
F_Rules/Rule%20FF.htm. 
30. Newton Conover (N.C.) Board of Education, Policy 7302, 
“Naming School Facilities,” www.nccs.k12.nc.us/Policy/Policy7000.
doc.
31. Rochester City School Board, Policy Manual 7500, “Naming 
New Facilities” (revised August 20, 1998), www.rcsdk12.org/BOE/
PM/PM%20pdfs/7000/7500%20Naming%20Facilities.pdf.
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approving message about the sponsor—“Th is sponsor is 
upstanding enough for us to associate ourselves with it”—
the choice of sponsors must also be considered a form of 
government speech.32 In many ways this situation is analo-
gous to that of public broadcasters such as National Public 
Radio, whose editorial decisions have been characterized as 
a form of speech.33
Th is article does not address in any detail one fi nal vari-
ant on the government speech inquiry: the possibility that 
school naming rights arrangements might give rise to a 
compelled speech claim by students who object to the name 
they are forced to carry around on their transcripts or uni-
forms. Student opposition to schoolhouse commercialism 
has already made headlines—perhaps most famously when 
a high school student was suspended for wearing a Pepsi 
shirt to a “Coke Day” rally—demonstrating that some stu-
dents see sponsorship as important enough to oppose.34 Th e 
Supreme Court has already ruled in prior student speech 
cases that there is no constitutionally signifi cant diff er-
ence between compelled speech and compelled silence.35 
Creative First Amendment lawyers may therefore challenge 
school naming rights arrangements based on compelled-
speech grounds as well.
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Of course, schools are not the only potential speakers 
implicated by school naming rights arrangements. Indeed, 
many observers might consider the sponsor—the organiza-
tion that pays to have its name placed on the building—as 
32. See Knights of KKK and Nathan Robb v. Arkansas State 
Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 807 F. Supp. 1427, 1436 (W.D. Ark. 1992) 
(“If nothing else, they, by picking up or having their members or 
employees pick up litter, thus keeping their adopted portion of the 
highway beautiful and litter free, are saying or hoping to say to 
the travelling public by actions and deeds, and through the signs 
constructed by the State of Arkansas, that they are ‘good’ and 
environmentally conscious, and thus good citizens and politically 
and socially correct.”); Knights of the KKK v. Curators of the 
University of Missouri [—St. Louis], 203 F.3d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir. 
2000) (“KWMU’s underwriting acknowledgments constitute 
governmental speech on the part of UMSL.”).
33. In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 
for example, the Court found that “when a public broadcaster 
exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of 
its programming, it engages in speech activity.” 523 U.S. 666, 674 
(1998); see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 
585–86 (1998) (fi nding that viewpoint neutrality is not required in 
selection of art exhibits for public funding).
34. See, e.g., Jingle Davis, “No Coke, Pepsi: Rebel without a 
Pause,” Atlanta Constitution, March 26, 1998 (Constitution edition); 
Barry Saunders, “OK, Class—Line Up, Dress Right, and Salute the 
Image,” Raleigh News and Observer, March 28, 1998.
35. E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding 
that the First Amendment’s guarantees “include both the right to 
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all”). 
the speaker. Th e message that sponsor would most likely 
send is a commercial one; that is, one encouraging people 
to purchase its products or services. And, in a somewhat 
unpredictable line of cases, the Supreme Court has gradu-
ally extended First Amendment protection to this kind of 
commercial speech while refusing to settle on a single defi -
nition for the category. Th is section attempts to sketch the 
boundaries of commercial speech and explain the standard 
that governs it.
Th e law of commercial speech has recently been defi ned 
by two, apparently competing but actually complementary, 
trends: (1) a progressive narrowing of the category of com-
mercial speech, and (2) a progressive strengthening of the 
protections accorded to it. Th e combined eff ect of these 
trends is to increase the protections available for seemingly 
commercial speech. Such protection can be achieved either 
by entirely avoiding the commercial label—the best way 
to protect commercial speech, aft er all, is to not label it as 
such—or by requiring the government regulating commer-
cial speech to carry a heavy justifi catory burden.
Th e contracting defi nition of commercial speech
Th e Court has never decided on a single defi nition of 
commercial speech, although it has invoked various fac-
tors and ad hoc tests.36 Perhaps the fi rst eff ort was Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Council, which suggested that “commer-
cial speech” is speech that does “‘no more than propose a 
commercial transaction.’” 37 Later opinions tended to follow 
this approach, giving full First Amendment protection (by 
not classifying their messages as commercial speech) to a 
variety of “mixed” cases involving both commercial and 
noncommercial messages.38
36. Scholars attribute this imprecision to the inherent diffi  culties 
of classifying commercial speech. See. e.g., Nat Stern, “In Defense 
of the Imprecise Defi nition of Commercial Speech,” Maryland. Law 
Review 58, no. 1 (1999): 55, 146 (“Th e Supreme Court’s inability 
to encase commercial speech within unwavering defi nitional 
boundaries is not the product of ineptitude, but rather the 
unavoidable incident of commercial speech’s position at the blurry 
crossroads of expressive and economic activity.”); Robert Post, “Th e 
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech,” UCLA Law Review 48 
(October 2000): 1, 7 (“Th e impossibility of uniquely identifying the 
attributes of commercial speech has been much noted.”).
37. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Com. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1976)); 
see also Th omas C. Goldstein, “Nike v. Kasky and the Defi nition of 
‘Commercial Speech,’ in Cato Supreme Court Review, 2002–2003, 
ed. James L. Swanson (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute), 72, 
referring to Blackmun’s as the “most oft en-repeated” defi nition of 
commercial speech the Court has off ered.
38. E.g., Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 
789, 798 (1988).
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Th e current prevailing defi nition of commercial speech is 
essentially a non-test established by the Supreme Court in 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. In that case, the Court 
upheld the “‘common-sense’ distinction between speech 
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an 
area traditionally subject to government regulation, and 
other varieties of speech.”39 Th e Court has continued to use 
this approach while acknowledging its imprecision.40
Commercial speech law is currently in a state of fl ux, and 
the Supreme Court has recently indicated that it may be 
considering a bit of housecleaning. In 2004 the California 
Supreme Court decided Kasky v. Nike,41 a case arising from 
a private citizen’s criticism of the Nike Corporation for 
allegedly engaging in sweatshop abuse in its overseas fac-
tories. Th e criticism itself was undoubtedly fully protected, 
noncommercial speech. Nike responded to it with “editorial 
advertisements,” press releases, and letters to newspapers 
and universities.42 One of the issues in the case was whether 
these publicized responses were commercial speech.
Th e California Supreme Court found that they were, 
because (1) the speaker (Nike) was likely to be engaged in 
commerce, (2) the intended audience were actual or poten-
tial buyers, and (3) the actual message made representations 
of fact about Nike’s business operations, products, or ser-
vices.43 Th e decision caused enormous controversy in the 
academic community, where scholars were almost unani-
mous in their condemnation and their calls for the U.S. 
Supreme Court to intervene.44 Th e Court did, granting cer-
tiorari and arousing hope that it might use the opportunity 
to establish a clear defi nition of commercial speech. But the 
Court then dismissed the writ of certiorari (over dissents 
from Justices Kennedy and Breyer), thus leaving commer-
cial speech itself ill-defi ned.45 
39. Bolger, 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
40. See, e.g., Edenfi eld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993) 
(“[A]mbiguities may exist at the margins of the category of 
commercial speech.”); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 
U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (acknowledging “the diffi  culty of drawing 
bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct 
category”). 
41. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 
U.S. 1099, and cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 564 (2003).
42. Goldstein, “Nike v. Kasky,” 65.
43. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 258; 315, see also Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980) 
(diff erentiating between “direct comments on public issues” 
and statements about public policy “made only in the context of 
commercial transactions”). 
44. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover, “Th e 
Landmark Free-Speech Case Th at Wasn’t: Th e Nike v. Kasky 
Story,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 54 (Summer 2004): 965; 
Goldstein, “Nike v. Kasky.” 
45. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 665 (2003).
Expanding protections for commercial speech
For most of this history, commercial speech received no 
First Amendment protection at all.46 But beginning with 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Coun-
cil, the Supreme Court began to recognize commercial 
speech (even basic advertising) as a form of speech entitled 
to some First Amendment protection, albeit not the same 
level of protection accorded to “pure” speech.47 
Governmental restrictions on commercial speech are 
now governed by a four-part test created by the Supreme 
Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service 
Commission. Th e fi rst part of the test asks whether the 
speech being regulated “concerns lawful activity and [is 
not] misleading.”48 If the speech fails this initial inquiry, 
it receives no First Amendment protection at all.49 If it 
passes, the second prong then assesses whether the govern-
ment interest in the speech is “substantial.”50 Th e third asks 
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental 
interest asserted; and the fourth, and fi nal, prong measures 
the breadth of the regulation to see if it is more extensive 
than is necessary to serve the stated interest.51 Th ough the 
second and third prongs are comparatively easy for a regu-
lation to meet,52 the fi nal prong has become an increasingly 
sizeable obstacle.53
Central Hudson endures as a test, but its application has 
not always been even-handed. In Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the Supreme Court 
held that Puerto Rico could ban all outdoor advertising of 
casinos.54 But more recently, in 44 Liquormart, the Court 
46. Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding 
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance forbidding distribution 
of printed handbills for commercial advertising in the streets, even 
though half of the handbill was devoted to a nominally political 
protest).
47. Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
48. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
49. Hoff man Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (holding 
that the government may entirely ban commercial speech that 
proposes illegal transactions); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) 
(upholding statute prohibiting the practice of optometry under 
misleading names).
50. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
51. Id. 
52. Th e Court has upheld as valid government interests the 
promotion of energy conservation, id. at 566; the prevention of 
drunkenness, 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); 
and the protection of public safety in the context of compounded 
drugs, Th ompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
53. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569–72. See also 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (citing 
Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995), and striking 
down state restriction on tobacco advertising).
54. 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986) (“In short, we conclude that the 
statute and regulations at issue in this case, as construed by the 
Superior Court, pass muster under each prong of the Central 
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held that a complete ban on price advertising of liquor failed 
both the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson.55
In summary, at the same time as it has trimmed the 
defi nition of commercial speech—thus leaving other, 
seemingly commercial speech in the full protection of the 
First Amendment—the Supreme Court has also expanded 
the protections given to speech it still categorizes as 
commercial.56 
Naming rights as commercial speech: 
A second-best option
Although government speech is, from the schools’ per-
spective, the most desirable category for naming rights—
carrying with it almost unlimited power to select and 
reject sponsors—the commercial speech category also 
has its advantages. In spite of the increasing protection 
given to commercial speech—and its increasingly narrow 
defi nition—schools that can successfully characterize their 
naming rights arrangements as the sponsors’ commercial 
speech will retain some power to reject sponsors under the 
Central Hudson test.
Naturally, the best way for schools to argue that naming 
rights are commercial speech is to highlight the various 
indicia of advertising and commercialism contemplated in 
Bolger. So, for example, the label “Phil Knight High School” 
might not be considered commercial speech, even though 
the Nike Corporation (which Phil Knight founded) paid 
for the naming rights. But “Nike Gymnasium” would pres-
ent a closer question, since use of the company’s name—
particularly in conjunction with a place and activities where 
its products are used—is more suggestive of commercial 
intent, which is a relevant consideration under Bolger and 
even more so under the controversial Kasky test. Similarly, 
if the trademark Nike swoosh and the words “Just Do It” 
were part of the sponsorship arrangement, the arrangement 
would be seen as even more commercial.
Th is line of argument may seem somewhat odd, given 
that schools (faced with the anticommercialism sentiment 
described above) probably would not otherwise stress the 
commercial nature of their naming rights arrangements. 
Most would prefer—for public relations purposes, at least—
to characterize them as charitable contributions. And, just 
as ironically, sponsors might fi nd that the weight of their 
arguments against characterizing naming rights as govern-
ment speech actually pushes them toward the commercial 
Hudson test. We therefore hold that the Supreme Court of Puerto 
Rico properly rejected appellant’s First Amendment claim.”).
55. 517 U.S. at 505–08.
56. See Stern, “In Defense of the Imprecise Defi nition of 
Commercial Speech,” 72: “Th e splintered opinions in 44 Liquormart 
should not obscure the fact that this decision heralded a more 
protective attitude toward commercial speech.”
speech category, where they are still entitled to at least some 
limited protections. Th us in terms of the legal category of 
commercial speech, the incentives are somewhat reversed: 
schools are better served when naming rights are catego-
rized as commercial because they retain greater authority 
to regulate them, whereas sponsors have a correspondingly 
larger incentive to stress the noncommercial aspects of the 
deals because they receive more First Amendment protec-
tion under the “pure” noncommercial category.
If a naming rights arrangement is classifi ed as commer-
cial speech, any regulations governing naming rights would 
very likely pass the four-prong test laid out in Central Hud-
son. Th e fi rst prong of the test would probably be irrelevant, 
since most sponsors’ names are presumably legal and not 
“misleading.” Th e second prong—requiring the government 
to show a substantial interest—would not present a major 
hurdle for schools, because they could assert that such regu-
lations further the government’s interest in education—one 
of the most “substantial” government interests of all.57 
In addressing the third prong of Central Hudson—which 
asks whether the regulation at issue directly advances the 
government interest asserted—schools could rely on exist-
ing research about the negative impact of advertising and 
commercialism on students’ ability to learn. Th e decades-
old battles over commercialism in schools have produced 
ample information from which to draw.58 
Th e fourth prong of Central Hudson—measuring the 
potential overbreadth of the regulation—might present 
a more signifi cant obstacle. Prior to the Supreme Court’s 
1996 decision in 44 Liquormart, overbreadth was almost 
impossible to establish, and the Court repeatedly upheld 
total bans on entire classes of advertisements.59 In 44 
57. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) 
(internal citations omitted) (“We have repeatedly acknowledged 
the overriding importance of preparing students for work and 
citizenship, describing education as pivotal to ‘sustaining our 
political and cultural heritage’ with a fundamental role in 
maintaining the fabric of society.”). 
58. See above, notes 15–20 and accompanying text. See also Seth 
Grossman, Comment, “Grand Th eft  Oreo: Th e Constitutionality of 
Advergame Regulation,” Yale Law Journal 115 (October 2005): 227, 
234 (arguing that regulation of snack food “advergames” should 
pass the third prong of Central Hudson “so long as the government 
carefully and thoroughly compiles such evidence of the link 
between advergames and the health of children”).
59. Compare Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344 (holding that under 
Central Hudson it was “up to the legislature” to reduce gambling 
by suppressing in-state casino advertising rather than by applying 
some less speech-restrictive policy) with 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 
at 509 (“Given our longstanding hostility to commercial speech 
regulation of this type, Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it 
was ‘up to the legislature’ to choose suppression over a less speech-
restrictive policy.”). See also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508–13 (White, J., 
joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ) (fi nding that total 
ban on outdoor advertising passed all prongs of Central Hudson, 
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Liquormart, however, the Court revived the fourth prong 
of Central Hudson by making it clear that even though 
the narrowness inquiry is less harsh than strict scrutiny, it 
nonetheless requires the state to shoulder a “heavy burden 
of justifying its complete ban on price advertising.”60 To 
carry that burden, schools might turn back to the evidence 
they marshaled to meet the second prong. Although courts 
have yet to explicitly note a connection between the second 
and fourth prongs of Central Hudson, logic suggests that it 
might exist. For example, in the pre-Central Hudson case of 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, the Supreme Court 
found that a broad ban preventing lawyers from soliciting 
clients in person was a permissible regulation of commer-
cial speech, given the important governmental interest in 
protecting those solicited from undue pressure.61 
Although the commercial speech inquiry is relatively 
fact-intensive and it is correspondingly diffi  cult to gener-
alize about whether the courts will consider a particular 
naming rights arrangement to be commercial speech, the 
discussion here has illuminated some general lessons. Gen-
erally, school attorneys hoping to argue that a particular 
naming rights deal falls within the commercial speech 
category (thus preserving the school’s broad authority to 
pick and choose among sponsors), would do well to stress 
its commercial aspects, including the identity of the sponsor 
and whether the intended audience (students, for example) 
are actual or potential buyers.62
FORUM ANALYSIS
It is of course possible that schools or sponsors will charac-
terize school naming rights as neither government speech 
nor commercial speech but as something else entirely: 
noncommercial speech on the part of the sponsors. Aft er 
all, schools and sponsors oft en refer to such arrangements 
as charitable donations reciprocated by the school’s show of 
even though it failed on other First Amendment grounds); 44 
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 508 (citing Metromedia for the proposition 
that “Our commercial speech cases recognize some room for the 
exercise of legislative judgment.”). 
60. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 516.
61. Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (“Under our view of the 
State’s interest in averting harm by prohibiting solicitation in 
circumstances where it is likely to occur, the absence of explicit 
proof or fi ndings of harm or injury is immaterial. Th e facts in 
this case . . . demonstrate the need for prophylactic regulation in 
furtherance of the State’s interest in protecting the lay public.”). 
But see In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (fi nding that an ACLU 
lawyer’s letter to a group of indigent political clients falls within 
the “generous zone of First Amendment protections reserved for 
associational freedoms” and that “[w]here political expression or 
association is at issue, this Court has not tolerated the degree of 
imprecision that oft en characterized government regulation of the 
conduct of commercial aff airs”).
62. Kasky, 45 P.3d 243, 258 (Cal. 2002). 
thanks (for example, a plaque displaying the donor’s name), 
making the exchange very similar to other noncommercial 
donor-donee relationships. If naming rights are charac-
terized as this kind of noncommercial, nongovernmental 
speech, sponsors will be entitled to the full protection of the 
First Amendment and restrictions on their speech will have 
to meet the forum analysis tests governing pure speech.
Defi ning the forum
For First Amendment purposes, there are three diff erent 
forums—public forums, nonpublic forums, and limited 
public forums—and the power of the government to regu-
late pure speech depends on the forum in which the speech 
takes place.63 
Traditional public forums are areas “which the State 
has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive 
activity.”64 Th e government has little power to regulate 
speech in such forums. Th e only permissible restrictions 
are content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions or 
content-based restrictions that are narrowly drawn to serve 
a compelling state interest.65 Fortunately for school boards, 
naming rights policies are unlikely to create public forums. 
Nevertheless, if a school board were to fail to exercise con-
trol over its sponsors, it might fi nd itself the unsuspecting 
custodian of a public forum.66 
By contrast, in nonpublic forums such as military 
bases and the sidewalks outside post offi  ces, the govern-
ment has broad power to regulate speech.67 Restrictions 
63. For the purposes of forum analysis, “place” includes not 
just physical property but even such channels of communications 
as intraschool mail systems. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors 
of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (“Th e SAF 
is a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic 
sense, but the same principles are applicable.”) (internal citations 
omitted); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 
788, 801 (1985) (treating charitable contribution fund as property 
for purposes of forum analysis); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (describing forum analysis). 
64. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
65. Id.; Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 
672, 678 (1992) (upholding reasonable restrictions on distribution 
of religious literature and solicitation in an airport terminal, which 
is not a traditional public forum); Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788 (holding 
that Combined Federal Campaign created a nonpublic forum in 
which restrictions must be reasonable and that refusal to allow 
certain advocacy groups to participate in that forum abridged their 
First Amendment Rights). 
66. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (holding that a silent 
vigil in a public library is protected, while a noisy and disruptive 
demonstration would not be); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (finding that students have a First 
Amendment-protected right to wear black armbands as a protest, 
unless they result in disruption of school).
67. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976); United States 
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (suggesting existence of 
nonpublic forum but ultimately resolving case on other grounds).
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are acceptable, even if based on subject matter or speaker 
identity, so long as they are “reasonable in light of the pur-
pose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”68 In 
other words, the First Amendment does not prohibit the 
viewpoint-neutral exclusion of speakers who would hinder 
the purpose of the nonpublic forum.69 A naming rights 
policy might create a nonpublic forum by simply failing to 
provide for a sponsor’s expressive activity.70 
Th e most likely forum categorization for naming rights 
policies, however, is the limited public forum, a slightly 
amorphous category that courts have identifi ed as existing 
when the government opens a forum for expressive activity 
and intentionally makes it “generally available” to a certain 
class of speakers.71 In limited forums, the government can 
restrict speech based on subject matter and speaker identity, 
but the restrictions themselves must nonetheless be “nar-
rowly tailored to serve a signifi cant government interest 
while leaving open ample alternatives.”72
Within the broad category of the limited public forum, 
the Supreme Court has applied an especially deferential 
standard to regulations on speech in schools, recogniz-
ing that First Amendment claims must be considered “in 
light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
68. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
69. Th is fact of course raises the possibility that government 
actors might try to justify as “viewpoint-neutral” an otherwise 
invalid viewpoint-based restriction by pointing instead to the 
disruptive reaction caused by expression of that viewpoint. A school 
board, for example, might reject a controversial sponsor based on 
disruption that opposition to the sponsor would create. In the words 
of one court, though, “the First Amendment knows no heckler’s 
veto.” Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that possible dangerous public reaction is insuffi  cient 
rationale to bar the Ku Klux Klan from the Adopt a Highway 
Program).
70. See DeLoretto v. Downy Unifi ed Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 958, 
968–69 (9th Cir. 1999) (inferring and upholding existence of a 
“commercial only” policy that created a nonpublic forum in a school 
that had only ever accepted commercial advertisements and later 
refused to post the Ten Commandments); Mary Jean Dolan, “Th e 
Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships: 
New Extensions of Government Speech,” Hastings Constitutional 
Law Quarterly 31 (Winter 2004): 71, 126 (“In choosing sponsors and 
partners, government does not intend to open a forum for private 
speech, but rather to obtain assistance to leverage its own ability to 
act.”).
71. See, generally, Ronnie J. Fischer, “‘What’s in a Name?’: An 
Attempt to Resolve the ‘Analytic Ambiguity’ of the Designated and 
Limited Public Fora,” Dickinson Law Review 107 (Winter 2003): 639; 
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678–79.
72. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49; Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trustees 
of Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 562 (E.D. Va. 1998) (enjoining, on 
First Amendment grounds, library trustees from enforcing policy 
on Internet sexual harassment prohibiting access to certain content-
based categories of Internet publications).
ment.”73 Th e two leading cases—familiar to any school 
attorney—are Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School and Hazelwood School District v. Kulhmeier. In 
Tinker, the Court held that “[n]either students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”74 Th e Court found that 
a school’s prohibition on antiwar armbands violated the 
First Amendment and that the school’s fear of possible dis-
turbance caused by the armbands was not enough, by itself, 
to justify the ban. Hazelwood, however, confi rmed that 
in certain situations a school can restrict student speech, 
particularly when the speech would otherwise interfere 
with the educational mission of the school. Hazelwood thus 
stands for the proposition that materials to which students 
might be exposed can be regulated in some circumstances, 
especially for curricular purposes.75 Importantly for the 
present discussion, Hazelwood appears to encompass other 
means of expression—presumably including school names 
themselves—that bear the imprimatur of the school.76
Th e application of forum analysis does appear to depend 
somewhat on the speaker’s identity, at least when the speech 
is religious. In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free 
School District, the Supreme Court held that aft er-school use 
of school property created a limited forum but nonetheless 
struck down as viewpoint discrimination a school’s ban on 
aft er-school religious activities.77 Lamb’s Chapel can prob-
ably be explained as a product of the Court’s solicitousness 
of religious freedom. It suggests that religious sponsors rep-
resent a “viewpoint” rather than a “subject matter” and thus 
that regulations restricting their speech are bound to fail. 
The Way Forward
Naturally, it is diffi  cult to predict the legal results of still-
unfi led cases challenging nonexistent naming rights poli-
cies. Indeed, the most important take-home point of this 
article is that schools must be aware of the First Amend-
73. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) 
(quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
74. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
75. 484 U.S. at 261. Th is point regarding curriculum obviously 
raises a parallel with the earlier discussion of naming rights as 
curricula (see n. 31 and accompanying text above), which cast their 
curricular value as indicative of government speech. Nevertheless, 
as Bezanson and Buss write, Hazelwood “did not rest on a clearly 
defi ned idea of government speech, ” but rather “on doctrines 
premised on government’s role as regulator.” Randall P. Bezanson 
and William G. Buss, “Th e Many Faces of Government Speech,” 
86 Iowa Law Review 86 (August 2001): 1377, 1418. See also Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding 
that a school need not tolerate student speech that interferes with its 
“basic educational mission”).
76. 484 U.S. at 269.
77. 508 U.S. 384, 392–94 (1993).
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ment implications of naming rights—an awareness that 
few schools have demonstrated thus far. How schools can 
address those concerns—balancing the competing policy 
considerations for and against naming rights without run-
ning afoul of the First Amendment—is a matter for the 
sound discretion of individual school boards and their 
attorneys. Nevertheless, some general observations and 
recommendations are possible. 
THE NEED FOR POLICIES 
By far the most troubling trend in school naming rights is 
the degree to which schools seem to be operating without 
reference to any written policies whatsoever. Unlike univer-
sities, which generally have well-researched and very specifi c 
policies governing sales of naming rights, most school board 
policies refer only in general terms to naming schools aft er 
landmarks or historical fi gures.78 Sometimes they rely on 
community nominations and voting to select names for 
buildings or facilities.79 Th e closest most school boards come 
to recognizing sales of naming rights are policies allowing 
school facilities to be named aft er individuals who have 
made “contributions” to the schools or community.80 Even 
then, it is clear from their wording and application that most 
of these policies were draft ed to recognize nonfi nancial 
contributions such as long-standing service. Some school 
boards—including a few in North Carolina—do have poli-
cies recognizing the possibility of exchanging naming rights 
for remuneration, but the vast majority apparently do not.81
Th is lack of a pre-existing policy raises constitutional 
red fl ags, primarily because it opens school boards up to 
charges that they have rejected a particular sponsor based 
on disapproval of that sponsor’s viewpoint.82 Some school 
78. See, e.g., Durham (N.C.) Public Schools, Regulation 6090, 
“Naming Public Schools” (revised 1999): “New schools built in the 
Durham Public Schools normally will be named aft er townships, 
regions, or community characteristics.” Available at www.dspnc.net 
(search “6090”). 
79. See, e.g., Buncombe County Board of Education, Policy # 535 
(adopted December 9, 1993), which allows individuals to propose 
names to the superintendent, who must obtain the Board of 
Education’s “informal approval.” Available at www.buncombe.k12.
nc.us/modules/Downloads/fi les/namschl535ar.pdf. 
80. See, e.g., Shenandoah County (Va.) Public Schools, “Naming 
School Facilities” (adopted January 14, 1997), www.shenandoah.
k12.va.us/pdf/policymanual/Sec%20F%2005-06.pdf.
81. See, e.g., the policy of the Carteret County (N.C.) Public 
School System (revised January 2006), which notes that 
“[i]ndividual buildings, rooms or areas within buildings, or other 
structure on school campuses may be named in memory or honor 
of . . . [a]n individual who has helped students succeed through 
signifi cant fi nancial contribution or the donation of personal 
property.”
82. Irene Segal Ayers, “What Rudy Hasn’t Taken Credit For: First 
Amendment Limits on Regulation of Advertising on Government 
Property,” Arizona. Law Review 42, no. 1 (2000): 607, 623–24 (“Th e 
offi  cials may not believe that having a naming rights policy 
is important. Nonetheless, a pre-existing, written policy 
gives a school something to point to when claiming that a 
decision to reject a sponsor was driven by larger policy con-
cerns, not by animus for the sponsor’s viewpoint. A policy 
could even be as simple as the following statement: “In light 
of the need to protect student health and encourage healthy 
eating, Carolina County schools will not enter into naming 
rights arrangements with companies that sell soft  drinks.” 
A would-be sponsor might argue that it does not fall within 
the policy’s scope, but it would fi nd it much harder to claim 
viewpoint discrimination if other, similar sponsors are also 
excluded.
Of course, a poorly draft ed policy could itself raise First 
Amendment concerns. Commercial entities might, for 
example, challenge a policy that excludes all or some com-
mercial sponsors;83 and religious organizations might do so 
if a policy excludes them.84 But even if they are not a fail-
safe defense, pre-existing naming rights policies undoubt-
edly carry substantial advantages. 
FOLLOWING POLICIES 
Simply drawing up a policy governing school naming rights 
sales is not enough. To safeguard against First Amendment 
challenges, a policy must be followed scrupulously once it is 
put in place, a simple enough prescription that governmen-
tal actors in other areas have had diffi  culty following—oft en 
with disastrous results for the government.85
lack of clear, specifi c, narrowly draft ed government standards or 
policies that are consistently enforced has oft en been the problem in 
these advertising-on-government-property cases.”).
83. Mary Jean Dolan, “Th e Special Public Purpose Forum and 
Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions of Government 
Speech,” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 31 (Winter 2004), 
83 (“While a ‘commercial ads only’ policy does block most speech 
against public policy, it is an open question whether governments 
can further exclude a subset of such speech, typically alcohol and 
tobacco ads, where promoting such products contravenes the 
administration’s values” (internal citation omitted)).
84. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394.
85. Courts in a number of First Amendment cases have found 
that the lack of practical oversight over a policy was suffi  cient 
to create a public forum for free speech. See, e. g., Christ’s Bride 
Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 251 (3d 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068 (1999) (“In eff ect, SEPTA’s 
reservation of the right to reject any ad for any reason does not 
conclusively show that it intended to keep the forum closed.”); 
Planned Parenthood Ass’n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit 
Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1985) (fi nding that the city 
had created a limited public forum—despite its policy banning 
“immoral, vulgar, or disreputable” ads—because in practice it failed 
to distinguish among advertisers); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., 
Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 24–25 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(fi nding that it was “exceedingly diffi  cult to say whether the MBTA 
designated the interiors of its cars as public fora,” since there was 
little evidence in the record about past practice with regard to ad 
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In other areas of sponsorship and public-private partici-
pation, courts have repeatedly upheld First Amendment 
challenges on the grounds that the government—by failing 
to police a supposed forum—has (perhaps inadvertently) 
created a public forum where restrictions on speech are 
nearly impossible to justify.86 Th e lesson for school boards 
is clear: once a naming rights policy is put in place, schools 
must be careful to follow its terms. 
THE CONTENT OF THE POLICY
A myriad of options are available to school boards prepar-
ing to adopt policies on the sale of naming rights. Many 
school boards across the country have already opened their 
doors to commercial sponsors; others have barred commer-
cial sponsorship altogether; and still others have attempted 
to chart a middle course.87
Th e ultimate content of a naming rights policy—what it 
says about which sponsors it will and will not accept—is 
a decision that can only be made by school boards them-
selves. Th e Constitution does not mandate any particular 
decision, and schools are generally free to draw up policies 
as they see fi t, subject to the First Amendment restrictions 
set out above. School offi  cials that adopt a commercial 
sponsors-only policy—in an attempt, perhaps, to exclude 
religious sponsors—would be wise to familiarize themselves 
with commercial speech doctrine, since most sponsor dis-
selection); see also Frayda S. Bluestein, “A Funny Th ing Happened 
on the Way to the Forum: Free Speech Issues with Government 
Websites”) (unpublished manuscript on fi le with author, September 
2001), 5.
86. Th e only acceptable regulations on speech in a public forum 
are time, place, and manner restrictions that are viewpoint neutral, 
or content-based restrictions that are narrowly drawn to serve a 
signifi cant government purpose. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 
269–70 (1981).
87. See, e.g., Carteret County (N.C.) Public School System (see 
above, note 81); Center. for Commercial-Free Public Education, 
“San Francisco Passes the Commercial-Free Schools Act, Not for 
Sale” (Spring 2000), www.ibiblio.org/commercialfree/newsletters/
n1300_1.html (last visited July 12, 2006); Citizens’ Campaign for 
Commercial-Free Schools, “Corporations Lose Battle for Seattle 
Schools,” (November 21, 2001), www.asu.edu/educ/epsl/CERU/
Articles/CERU-0111-060OWI.doc (last visited July 12, 2006). 
putes fall under that rubric. As discussed above, challenges 
to regulation of commercial speech oft en rise or fall on the 
importance of the government interest asserted. School 
boards and their attorneys would therefore also be well-
advised to gather evidence about the government interests 
served by their restrictions (or, better yet, state them in their 
policies). Schools choosing to exercise more control over 
their naming rights arrangements—perhaps in an attempt 
to win the coveted “government speech” designation—
would do well to make it clear in their written policies 
that they consider their schools’ names to be important 
forms of expression in their own right.88 Even if this kind 
of language does not by itself create government speech, 
it may have the added benefi t of pushing naming rights 
into the same arena as the limited public forum cases that 
have upheld schools’ right to regulate speech for curricular 
purposes.89 
Conclusion
So far, there are no reported cases of would-be sponsors 
challenging their exclusion from a school’s naming rights 
policy. If school boards are attentive to the concerns raised 
in this article, that happy state of aff airs may very well 
continue. More likely, however, some disgruntled spon-
sor will seek constitutional redress, as would-be sponsors 
in so many other areas of government sponsorship have 
done. Sponsors’ successes in those cases suggest that they 
may succeed, even in the school naming rights arena, and 
that schools could be forced to accept naming rights deals 
from unsavory commercial or political groups. Th is article 
has attempted to describe the First Amendment standards 
implicated by school naming rights deals so that schools 
and their attorneys can formulate policies that guard 
against that possibility. ■
88. See, e.g., Rochester City School Board, Policy Manual 75000, 
“Naming New Facilities” (revised August 20, 1998), referring to the 
curricular value of naming rights. Available at www.rcsdk12.org/
BOE/PM/PM%20pdfs/7000/7500%20Naming%20Facilities.pdf. 
89. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 
(1988).
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